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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARION H. WEBB and JILL W. : 
BROWN, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. Case No 880137 
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES, 
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE : Priority Classification 
HOLCOMB, No. 14(b) 
Defendants/Appellants. 
APPELLANTS1 BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
The Court's Jurisdiction over this appeal arises from Utah 
Constitution Article VIII, § 3, Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
(1953, as amended) and Rule 3, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from an order granting default judgment in 
favor of Respondents Marian H. Webb and Jill W. Brown and against 
Appellants Vantage Income Properties, Bruce Honey and Steve 
Holcomb under Respondents' First Cause of Action alleging violations 
of the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act 
("RICE"), under §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q), and (s) of the act as was in 
effect at the time of the complaint. Default judgment was entered 
in favor of Respondents upon Defendants1 refusal to produce 
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certain documents, claiming privilege against self-incrimination 
under the Constitution of Utah and the United States Constitution. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did Appellants properly assert their privilege against 
self-incrimination by refusing to provide sales records and 
customer lists to Respondents who sought such information for the 
expressed purpose of establishing a pattern of racketeering 
activity on the part of Appellants? 
2. Did Appellant Holcomb waive his right to claim privilege 
against self-incrimination by making certain non-incriminating 
statements? 
3. May a Plaintiff sustain an action for civil remedies 
under the criminal RICE statute without first alleging specific 
actions of a Defendant in the Complaint that would warrant an 
indictment if presented to a grand jury? 
4. Should the Appellants be awarded costs and attorneyfs 
fees for this appeal which has been brought to protect their 
constitutional right against self-incrimination? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The constitutional provisions relevant to the determination 
of this case, copies of which are attached hereunder as Exhibit 
"A" to the Addendum, are as follows: 
1. Constitution of Utah, Article I, § 12. 
2. Constitution of the United States, Amendment V. 
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3. Utah Code Annotated, §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q), and (s) 
(1953, as amended) as in effect at the time of the Complaint. 
4. Utah Code Annotated, §76-10-1801 et sea. (1953, as amended) 
5. Utah Code Annotated, § 77-11-5 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, This is an appeal from an order 
granting default judgment in favor of Respondents against Appellants 
by reason of Appellants refusal to produce documents in a civil action 
brought under the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal 
Enterprise Act ("RICE") as it was in effect at the time the alleged 
violations occurred. Although the action was civil, the statue is 
a criminal statute that provides civil remedies if the Plaintiff 
is successful in proving that Defendant violated the criminal 
provisions of the statute. 
2. Course of Proceedings. During the discover phase of the 
case in early 1987, Appellants in this action refused to provide 
certain documents requested by Respondents for the expressed 
purpose of proving that Appellants had committed crimes under the 
statute. Appellants claimed privilege against self-incrimination 
under the Constitution of Utah and the Constitution of the United 
States. In October 1987, Respondents brought a motion to compel 
and for sanctions against Appellants. Appellants restated their 
claim of privilege against self-incrimination, and in December 
1987 the matter was again brought before the Trial Court, which 
ordered that if the documents were not produced, default judgment 
would be entered against the Appellants. In late December 1987, 
Appellants attempted to obtain permission to appeal the interlocutory 
order of Trial Court. Permission was refused, and Appellants 
informed the Trial Court that they would not waive their right to 
claim privilege against self-incrimination and refused to produce 
the documents sought by Respondent. 
3. Disposition at Trial Court. The Trial Court below ruled 
against Appellants' assertion of privilege againsc self-incrimination 
and entered default judgment against Appellants Honey and Vantage 
Income Properties on March 28, 1988, and against Appellant Holcomb 
on September 27, 1988 in the amount of $141,232.65. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Respondents commenced an action against Appellants on February 
21, 1986 for fraud and racketeering based on a real estate transaction 
that had taken place the previous summer wherein Respondents had 
purchased an apartment complex located at 576-604 Vine Street in 
Murray, Utah (Record, Pages 2-10). Appellants had represented 
Respondents as their real estate broker in the transaction. As a 
basis for racketeering, Respondents alleged actions and omissions 
of Appellants that constituted communications fraud, as set forth 
in § 76-10-1801 et seq. of the Utah Code Annotated, and the 
consummation of an alleged fraudulent real estate sale in violation 
of the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act 
("RICE") under §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q), and (s) of the act as was in 
effect at the time of the complaint (Record, Pages 8-10). A 
statutory prerequisite for a racketeering cause of action under 
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RICE was the establishment of a pattern of racketeering activity, 
defined under § 76-10-1602(4) as: 
. . . at least two episodes of racketeering conduct 
which have the same or similar objectives, results, parti-
cipants, victims or methods of commission, or are otherwise 
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not 
isolated events, provided at least one of the episodes 
occurred after the effective date of this part and the last 
of which occurred within five years after the commission of 
a prior episode of racketeering conduct. 
On April 8, 1987, after a motion to compel had been granted 
to Respondents (Record, Page 89), Appellants responded to specific 
requests by Respondents for the production of documents, which 
included customer sales records of Vantage Income Properties and 
customer lists of Defendant Steve Holcomb, by refusing to produce 
such documents, claiming privilege against self-incrimination 
(Record, Pages 135-138). 
On October 5, 1987, Respondents brought a motion to strike 
Appellants answers and enter default by reason of Appellants1 
failure to produce the documents (Record, Pages 101-115). Appellants 
argued at the hearing that the only fact that could be proven 
from such documents was a pattern of racketeering based on previous 
real estate transactions (Record, Page 122). Accordingly, they 
argued, such testimony would be incriminating because it would 
establish that Appellants had indeed committed a crime. 
Respondents asserted on page 5 of their memorandum in support 
of the October 5th motion that the information was needed to 
assist in the preparation of Respondents1 case of fraud and racket-
eering (Record, Page 107). At the hearing, Mr. Newton, counsel 
for Respondents, argued that Respondents were seeking others who 
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might have similar claims against the Appellants to support their 
allegations of a pattern of racketeering and thus assist Respondents 
efforts to get Mr. Holcomb "off of the streets'1 (Record, Page 
180) . 
the Court ruled that the answers provided in the responses to 
Respondents' request for production of documents that were delivered 
to Respondents on April 8, 1987 were inadequate under the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and further, did not state sufficiently the 
grounds upon which Appellants claimed a privilege against self-
incrimination (Record, Pages 134, 139-141). The Court ordered 
Appellants to file supplementary responses within 10 days. 
Supplemental responses were filed by Appellants on October 14, 
1987 that conformed with the Rules of Civil Procedure and provided 
a more detailed basis of Appellants' claims for 5th amendment 
protection (Addendum, Exhibit "B"). Responding therein to the 
specific request for sales records and customer lists, Appellants 
stated the following: 
Defendants object to producing such information and/or 
documents, and invoke their 5th amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination for the following reasons. 
Plaintiffs have stated repeatedly, in their oral arguments 
before this Court on April 8, 1987, in their Memorandum 
in Support of Striking Defendants' Answer on file 
herein, and in their oral argument before this Court on 
October 5, 1987, that the expressed purpose of obtaining 
information under this request is to discover information 
that will support their claims under the First Cause of 
Action in the Complaint herein against Defendants for 
alleged violations of the Utah Racketeering Influences 
and Criminal Enterprise Act ("RICE") specifically 
enumerated in §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q) and (s). 
The specific provisions allegedly violated by 
Defendants, as set forth in the First Cause of Action 
in the Complaint herein, constitute a second degree 
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felony in the State of Utah. §§ 76-10-1602 and 76-10-
1603 state that a "pattern of racketeering activity" 
must be proved to establish liability. Plaintiffs 
further assert in their First, Second and Fourth Causes 
of Action that Defendants have committed acts or omissions 
that would constitute criminal violations of the Commun-
ications Fraud statute found at § 76-10-1801 of the 
Criminal Code which would also constitute a second 
degree felony. 
Plaintiffs seek to support their allegations of 
racketeering in the Complaint herein by "fishing" 
through the sales records and customers of Steve Holcomb 
in an attempt to find anyone who might join in Plaintiffs' 
criminal allegations and thus establish a "pattern of 
racketeering activity." This was expressly represented 
by Paul Newton, counsel for Plaintiffs at the hearing 
on October 5, 1987, who stated substantially, or words 
to the effect, that Plaintiffs wanted to find other 
customers who were no longer "loyal" to Mr. Holcomb, 
and assist Plaintiffs in their efforts to "get him off 
the streets." 
If Defendants are required to produce such documents, 
and, if Plaintiffs are successful in establishing 
sufficient evidence from such records that Defendants 
have indeed violated provisions of RICE and thus committed 
a second degree felony, then such violations shall have 
been established through their own testimony, in direct 
conflict with their expressed desire and constitutional 
privilege not to provide any testimony that would tend 
to incriminate themselves. It is well established 
that Plaintiffs have a burden of establishing such 
criminal liability on the face of their complaint in 
order to obtain the treble damages they seek as civil 
relief under §76-10-1605. If Plaintiffs have carried 
their burden, there is no need for further supportive 
discovery. If they have not plead violations of RICE 
sufficient to establish liability under RICE, which in 
this case is clear they have not, then they cannot 
force Defendants, in violation of their 5th amendment 
rights, to provide information that could be used in 
any way to establish such liability and prove that 
Defendants had indeed committed a second degree felony. 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Holcomb has 
previously waived his 5th amendment rights in testimony 
found on pages 48, 54, 59, 60, and 84-88 of Mr. Holcomb1s 
deposition of December 4, 1986, which deposition remains 
unpublished in this action. Defendants assert that 
Defendant Holcomb has made no representation whatsoever 
on those pages, or at any other part of said deposition 
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that he has committed any act that can be construed as 
a criminal violation of RICE or any other criminal 
statute that would constitute a waiver of his 5th 
amendment rights, nor has he testified to any matter 
therein that can only be verified or established by a 
review of the sales records of Vantage Income Properties 
or customer lists of Steve Holcomb. 
Mr. Newton argued before the Court on October 5, 
1987 that Mr. Holcomb had testified that there were 
numerous times that he had to take property back, 
implying to the Court that Mr. Holcomb had committed 
alleged criminal acts. As clearly stated on the pages 
referred to by Plaintiffs' counsel in the deposition, 
each decision by Mr. Holcomb to take property back was 
based on a business judgment that served the interests 
of all parties concerned, and in no instance were the 
Defendants ever compelled to take back such properties. 
In summary, Defendants object to providing information 
in the sales records or from Mr. Holcombfs list of 
customers on the basis that any information found by 
Plaintiffs in such records and lists that could support 
their expressed goal of proving their allegations of 
criminal violations by Defendants, and establish a 
pattern of racketeering, or any other provision of the 
RICE or Communications Fraud statutes, would accordingly 
be incriminating, and consequently Defendants invoke 
their 5th amendment right not to testify in any manner 
against themselves. This objection is supported by 
Defendants1 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs1 
Motion to Strike Defendants1 Answer which was previously 
filed in this matter and argued before the Court on 
October 5, 1987, which memorandum is incorporated 
herein by reference. 
On October 29, 1987, Respondents filed another motion for 
sanctions against Appellants on the basis that the Appellants had 
filed a response that did nothing more than "reiterate their 
prior arguments concerning their privilege against self incrimination. 
They have provided this court with no more information than they 
previously have provided concerning how this information might 
incriminate them" (Record, Page 142-154). 
The matter was argued on December 7, 1987. The Court ruled 
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that (1) Defendant Steve Holcomb had made a waiver of his 5th 
amendment privilege in a deposition by stating, "Our company was 
very proud of the fact that in the hundreds of apartment houses 
that we sold, we had very few people that were dissatisfied with 
the service we had performed," and (2) that the Appellants could 
not assert the Fifth Amendment as and objection and privilege to 
Respondents1 request for production of documents when Appellants 
had "failed to show and would not represent that there is anything 
contained within such documents that is incriminating" (Record, 
Page 196-198). 
On December 24, 1987, Appellants filed a Petition for Permission 
to Appeal Interlocutory Order with the Utah Supreme Court in an 
attempt to have the matter of privilege against self-incrimination 
reviewed before Appellants would have to choose between incurring 
the sanctions of the court by refusing to comply with its order, 
or irrevocably waiving their rights by providing the information. 
In early January, 1988 the Utah Supreme Court denied Appellants' 
petition, and pursuant to an order made by the District Court on 
January 4, 1988, Appellants gave notice to Respondents of their 
intent not to produce the documents requested by Respondents and 
thereby waive Appellants1 claim of privilege against self-incrim-
ination (Record, Page 212). On February 1, 1988, upon motion by 
Respondents, the Court struck Appellants' answers to Respondents' 
First Cause of Action, entered Default Judgment against Appellants 
in favor of Respondents, certified his order for appeal under 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and stayed 
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proceedings on the remaining causes of action pending the outcome 
of the appeal (Record, Page 217 and 251), 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provide that no 
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The 
privilege may be invoked if an answer might incriminate and there 
is some possibility that a criminal action might be filed; [Rogers 
v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1951)], even though no 
criminal charges are pending [Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 
547, 562 (1892)]. The privilege against self-incrimination was 
extended to the production of documents in the landmark case of 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), and has since been 
held to require the elements of (1) compulsion (2) of a testimonial 
communication, and that (3) the communication could be incriminating, 
such that it could furnish "a link in the chain of evidence" that 
could be used to prosecute the individual invoking the privilege, 
[United States v. Hoffman, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951)] 
The order of trial court required Appellants to produce 
documents that may have incriminated them, in spite of their 
continuous, and good faith efforts to inform the Trial Court of 
the danger of self-incrimination. The order to produce the sales 
records and customer lists over Appellants privilege against 
self-incrimination was patently unconstitutional. 
Trial Court also erred in its ruling that Appellant Holcomb 
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waived his right to claim privilege against self-incrimination by 
making statements that are obviously not incriminating in and of 
themselves. 
Finally, Respondents should not be allowed to recover, even 
by a default judgment, under complaint allegations that on their 
face do not sufficiently state a cause of action under the statutory 
requirements for racketeering; nor should Appellants incur the 
cost of judgment and this appeal as a price to pay for their 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1: APPELLANTS HAVE PROPERLY ASSERTED THEIR 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
IN REFUSING TO PRODUCE CERTAIN DOCUMENTS AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANTS, 
The basis for privilege against self-incrimination is found 
in Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and in the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States 
Supreme Court has interpreted the privilege against self-incrimination 
in numerous cases, many of which apply directly to the issues 
raised in this appeal. 
To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from 
the implications of the question, [emphasis added] in the 
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to 
the question, or an explanation of why it cannot be answered 
might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result, 
rHoffman, at 486-87] 
The Court further stated in Hoffman that an individual 
claiming such privilege need not give a detailed explanation of 
why the privilege is invoked, because such disclosure in and of 
itself could be incriminating. 
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. . . if the witness, upon interposing his claim were 
required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a 
claim is usually required to be established in court, 
he would be compelled to surrender the very protection 
which the privilege is designed to guarantee. [.Id. at 486] 
In the case at bar, the implications of the question are 
simple, and have been restated by Respondents on numerous occasions; 
they want to find information to support a pattern of racketeering 
on the part of Appellants by perusing the customer lists of 
Appellant Steve Holcomb and the business records of Vantage 
Income Properties, even though such information bears no relevance 
whatsoever to the specific, expressed allegations set forth in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint [emphasis added]. The only value of such 
information, is to provide collateral proof that Appellants have 
engaged in a "pattern of racketeering" and in doing so, have 
violated the criminal provisions of RICE. 
IF Appellants had produced such documents, and jCF Respondents 
had successfully found information sufficient to support their 
allegations of a "pattern of racketeering", then the establishment 
of that fact would have come from Appellants own testimony by 
providing Respondents with incriminating evidence to show that 
indeed, they had committed crimes and were liable to Respondents. 
Both parties to this appeal have relied on a Utah case, 
First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Salt Lake City v. 
Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1267 (Utah, 1984) which cited a federal 
case, Davis v. Fendier, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981) 
stating that in order to assert a 5th amendment privilege, it 
requires at a minimum, a good faith effort to provide the trial 
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judge with sufficient information from which he can make an 
intelligent evaluation of the claim. This point of law was 
stated in Schamanek to contrast the conduct of the Defendant Gail 
Schamanek, who had been sued by First Federal Savings and Loan 
over a cashier's check that was allegedly cashed, and then retrieved 
by the defendant when the teller's attention was diverted. In that 
case, the defendant made no effort whatsoever to explain the 
basis of her 5th amendment claim of privilege, and refused to 
comply with an order of the Court demanding that she submit to 
discovery. The Utah Supreme Court provided a complete synopsis 
of all the 5th amendment holdings that could have protected Ms. 
Schamanek, had she only made a good faith effort to tell the 
Court why the information requested could have incriminated her. 
She made no effort, and consequently her answer was stricken. 
In this case, Appellants had clearly, and repeatedly asserted 
that the specific information sought by Respondents for the expressed 
purpose of establishing a pattern of racketeering, if provided by 
Respondents, could incriminate themselves as having committed 
crimes under RICE. Appellants claims were not, as argued by 
Respondents, a simple rendition of legal arguments explaining a 
theoretical reason why they should not have to comply with Respon-
dents1 discovery requests. It was a clear and convincing fact 
that if Respondents were able to find information that established 
a pattern of racketeering from the customer lists of Appellant 
Steve Hoicomb and the business records of Vantage Income Properties 
provided to Respondents by Appellants, then Appellants would have 
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in fact testified against themselves and established criminal 
liability, in direct conflict with their constitutional rights 
against self-incrimination. 
Respondents argued repeatedly that in order for Appellants 
to claim privilege against self-incrimination, they had to follow 
some ill-defined process of an "explanation of what criminal 
conduct might be charged and how the documents sought would 
provide a link in the chain to establishing such criminal charges." 
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Hoffman: 
. . . if the witness, upon interposing his claim, 
were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which 
a claim is usually required to be established in court, 
he would be compelled to surrender the very protection 
which the privilege is designed to guarantee. [Id. at 486] 
Even though the standard set in Hoffman did not require the 
criteria sought by Respondents, Appellants, in their response of 
October 14, 1987 set forth hereinabove, exceeded the requirements 
by providing a complete and detailed analysis of the threat of 
incrimination they were facing, far beyond what would have constituted 
good faith compliance with the Hoffman rule. 
The basis for Appellants1 objections to Respondents1 discovery 
requests and their ensuing claim of privilege against self-incri-
mination as provided to the Trial Court on October 14, 1987 set 
forth hereinabove, go far beyond the standards set by this Court 
and the United States Supreme Court for a valid assertion of such 
privilege, and accordingly, the Trial Court erred in granting 
default judgment in favor of Respondents. 
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POINT NO. II; NONE OF THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY APPELLANT HOLCOMB 
IN HIS DEPOSITION, OR OTHERWISE, IN THE CASE BELOW CONSTITUTED 
A WAIVER OF HIS PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION. 
Addressing the issue of statements that constitute a waiver 
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated in order for the fact so disclosed to constitute 
a waiver, the disclosed fact itself must be incriminating. 
[Rogers, at 373]. In a related case, In Re Corrugated Container 
Anti-Trust Litigation, 661 F.2d 1145, 1158 (7th Cir. 1981), the 
7th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even testimony previously 
given under protection of immunity did not constitute a waiver in 
subsequent "unprotected" actions. More importantly, however, the 
Court clearly enunciated the crux of self-incrimination issues in 
civil cases: 
Any inconvenience to the plaintiffs must pale in 
the face of denial of the fundamental right against self-
incrimination. 
In sum we are asked to rely on too many uncertainties. 
Plaintiffs assure us that Conboy will not be prosecuted. 
But Conboy might be prosecuted. Plaintiffs assure us that 
the deposition testimony could never be used against Conboy. 
But that testimony might be used against him. And when he 
does testify, he might face the possibility of perjury or 
waiver. 
In the face of these uncertainties, we should not 
conclude that Conboy1s Fifth Amendment protections do 
not apply. [Id. at 1159, emphasis added] [See also: 
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950)] 
In two related cases, Arndstein v. McCarthy, United Sates 
Marshall for the Southern District of New York, 254 U.S. 71 
(1920) and McCarthy, United States Marshall for the Southern 
District of New York v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355 (1923), the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated: 
-15-
. . . that since the evidence furnished "did not 
amount to an admission of guilt or furnish clear proof 
of a crime . . . the privilege had not been abandoned 
and the witness was entitled to stop short when further 
testimony might tend to incriminate him. [emphasis added] 
[see also Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1957)] 
In the case at bar, no rational interpretation of any statement 
made by Appellant Holcomb during his deposition can be construed 
in the most liberal of interpretations to constitute "an admission 
of guilt or furnish clear proof of a crime." In order for the above 
referenced statement to be construed as a waiver of Appellant 
Holcombfs privilege against self-incrimination, It must be shown 
that the statement relied upon as the basis of such waiver constituted 
an incriminating statement in and of itself, and that such waiver 
was knowingly and intentionally waived. [See Johnson v. Zerbst, 
Warden, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Accordingly the trial court's 
finding that Appellant Holcomb has waived his privilege against self-
incrimination is in error, and his constitutionally protected 
privilege against self-incrimination must be preserved. 
POINT NO. Ill: RSSPONDENTS SHOULD NOT BS ALLOWED TO PREVAIL IN 
AN ACTION BY DEFAULT OR OTHERWISE WHERE THE COMPLAINT FAILED 
TO PROPERLY SET FORTH SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO STATE A CAUSE 
OF ACTION FOR RACKETEERING AND WHERE THE PRIVILEGED INFORMATION 
SOUGHT FROM APPELLANTS WAS INTENDED TO CURE SUCH FLAW. 
A recent holding in Federal District Court for the District 
of Utah written by Judge Jenkins focused on the burden to be met 
by plaintiffs bringing RICO and RICE actions in the state of 
Utah. Addressing the need for courts to control overenthusiastic 
use of RICO and RICE Judge Jenkins wrote: 
A private civil action under RICO is grounded on 
the premise that a party has twice engaged in "racketeering 
activity". The Act defines "racketeering activity" as 
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behavior "indictable" [emphasis added] under specific 
provisions of the United States Code. . . possible only 
if the factual basis of those" acts of racketeering" is 
set out with particularity. [Bache Halsey Stuart Shields 
Incorporated v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Company, 
558 F.Supp. 1042, 1045 (D. Utah, 1983)] 
Judge Jenkins further pointed out that to properly plead a 
cause of action for RICO, an offense was not "indictable" [emphasis 
added] merely because it is alleged; it must be "well founded" 
and based on probable cause, [Id. citing Brazburg v. Hayes, 408 
U.S. 665, 668, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2660, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)] and 
must include a factual statement similar to a bill of particulars 
in a criminal action. [Id. at 1046]. 
Judge Jenkins contrasts the Utah RICE statute by stating: 
Rather than requiring the acts be "indictable", 
the Utah definition requires that the act be "illegal 
under the laws of Utah". Like the Federal Act, however, 
the Utah Racketeering Act suggests that the predicate 
crimes must be alleged with particularity. The court 
can determine whether the pleadings state a violation of 
the Utah Act only if the facts are sufficient to show that 
the alleged activity would be illegal in Utah and would 
fall into one of the enumerated categories. 
The statute is silent on the standard to be used 
in deciding if the alleged activity is illegal. However, 
even if the determination only requires a finding that 
the facts would be indictable, the burden is greater 
than under the federal statute. [Id. at 1047, emphasis 
added] 
The basis for applying a stricter standard under RICE than 
is found under RICO is explained as follows: 
In many states the grand jury is directed to indict 
if it finds "probable cause" to believe that the accused 
has committed a crime . . . In others, however, it is 
directed to indict "when all the evidence taken together, 
if unexplained or uncontradicted, would warrant the 
conviction of a defendant." . . . Since the trial jury 
would convict only if convinced of the accusedfs guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt [emphasis added], it generally 
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is assumed that this "prima facie case" standard imposes 
a substantially more rigorous test than the traditional 
"probable cause11 test. [Id. at 1048 citing Y. Kamisar, 
W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure,1025-26 
n.9 (5th ed. 1980)] 
Judge Jenkins concludes the analysis by pointing out that 
Utah has adopted the more demanding of these standards. As set 
forth in § 77-19-5 of the Utah Code Annotated at the time of the 
Complaint (now found at § 77-11-5): 
It is the duty of a grand jury to find an indictment 
when all the evidence before them, taken as a whole, 
would in their judgment justify a conviction by jury trial. 
In the case at bar, considering the racketeering allegations 
of Respondents, set forth in their Complaint, even in their best 
light, are insufficient to meet either a "prima facie case" 
standard, or a probable cause standard. 
As stated repeatedly by Respondents, the purpose for obtaining 
the sales record and customer list information, claimed by Appellants 
to be privileged, was to establish the necessary pattern of 
racketeering activity that would prove Appellants had committed 
the crime as alleged and accordingly facilitate Respondents1 
civil damages recovery. In essence, by refusing to testify 
against themselves, Appellants incurred a default judgment under 
a Complaint that was fatally flawed at the outset in its failure 
to state a racketeering cause of action. Clearly, Respondents 
should not benefit both from the denial of Appellants constitutional 
rights against self-incrimination and a the award of a default 
under a complaint that patently fails to meet the statutory 
requirements for a violation that would allow recovery for civil 
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damages. 
POINT IV: APPELLANTS SHOULD 3S AWARDED COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
HEREIN BECAUSE THEIR CLAIM OF FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE 
HAS BEEN VALIDLY ASSERTED IN LIEU OF PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. 
It has been well established by the U.S. Supreme Court, that 
a witness cannot be penalized for asserting a fifth amendment 
privilege. In Spevac v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1966) the Court 
reasserted its possession that: 
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state 
invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment 
guarantees against federal infringement—the right of 
a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak 
in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to 
suffer no penalty . . . for such silence. [Id. at 514] 
In this context "penalty" is not restricted to 
fine or imprisonment. It means, as we said in Griffin 
v. California, 380 U.S. 609, the imposition of any 
sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege "costly." [Id. at 515] 
In the case at bar, Appellants have suffered substantial 
cost for the assertion of their privilege against self-incrimination, 
including both the judgment entered against them, and the costs 
incurred on this appeal. Accordingly, Appellants should be 
awarded attorney's fees based upon the affidavit of counsel 
attached hereunder as Exhibit "C" to the Addendum. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The basis for Appellants1 objections to Respondents1 discovery 
requests and their ensuing claim of privilege against self-incri-
mination as provided to the Trial Court on October 14, 1987 set 
forth hereinabove, go far beyond the standards set by this Court 
and the United States Supreme Court for a valid assertion of such 
privilege, and accordingly, the Trial Court erred in granting 
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default judgment in favor of Respondents. Further, the Trial 
Court erred in its finding that statements made by Appellant 
Steve Holcomb at a deposition in this matter constituted a waiver 
of privilege against self incrimination, because such statements 
were not, in and of themselves, incriminating, 
Appellants have also argued herein that Respondents should 
not be allowed to take a default judgment against Appellants, 
even if their answers are stricken, because the complaint on its 
face fails to properly allege a valid pattern of unlawful activity 
as required for a racketeering cause of action. Respondents were 
well aware of the defect in their pleading, and were attempting 
to cure the problem by forcing Appellants to testify against 
themselves to establish such a pattern. 
Finally, Appellants have incurred substantial cost and 
penalties against them during the course of their claiming consti-
tutional rights against self-incrimination. By reason of well 
established rulings prohibiting such costs and penalties, Respondentsf 
judgment should be vacated and Appellants should be awarded costs 
and attorneyfs fees incurred in this Appeal. 
Appellants pray that the Trial Court below be reversed and 
the judgment herein vacated; and further, that Appellants be 
awarded costs and attorneys fees incurred in this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of March, 1989. 
MICHAEL S. ELDRSDGE \ 
Attorney for Appellants J 
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Certificate of Delivery 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered 4 true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to James L. 
Christensen, Esq. and Paul D. Newton, Esq. of CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & 
CHRISTENSEN, attorneys for Respondents, at 215 South State Street, 
Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 7th day of March, 1989. 
MICHAEL S. ELDREOGE 
Attorney for Appellants 
-21-
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit "A" - Statutory Provisions 
The Constitution of the United States, Amendment V, reads as follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, § 12, reads as follows: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-11-5 (1953, as amended), reads as follows: 
77-11-5. Duty to find indictments on sufficient showing. It is 
the duty of the grand jury to find an indictment when all the 
evidence before them, taken as a whole, would in their judgment 
justify a conviction by a jury trial. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 76-10-1601 et seq. (1953, as amended), and 
§ 76-10-1801 et seq. (1953, as amended) as of the time of filing 
the Complaint in the action below, are attached hereto. 
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of the owner of the property or the bus company, or its duly authorized representa-
tive is guilty of theft and shall be punished pursuant to section 76-6-412. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 8. 
76-10-1509. Obstructing operation of bus. Any person who unlawfully 
obstructs or impedes by force or violence, or any means of intimidation, the regular 
operation of a bus is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 9. 
76-10-1510. Obstructing operation of bus — Conspiracy. Two or more per-
sons who willfully or maliciously combine or conspire to violate section 76-10-1509 
shall each be guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 10. 
76-10-1511. Cumulative and supplemental nature of act. The provisions of 
this act shall be cumulative and supplemental to the provisions of any other law 
of the state. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 11. 
PART 16 
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES 
Section 
76-10-1601. Short title. 
76-10-1602. Definitions. 
76-10-1603. Unlawful acts — Felony — Forfeitures. 
76-10-1604. Enforcement authority of peace officers. 
76-10-1605. Remedies of person injured by pattern of racketeering activity 
orders of district court. 
76-10-1606. Payments to general fund of state. 
76-10-1607. Evidentiary value of criminal judgment in civil proceeding. 
76-10-1608. Separability clause. 
Authorized 
76-10-1601. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act." 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1601, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to organized fraudulent 
and illegal enterprise crime; designating the 
following activities as unlawful: to use or 
invest proceeds from a pattern of 
racketeering conduct in an enterprise; to 
acquire or maintain an interest in, or to con-
duct an enterprise through a pattern of 
racketeering conduct; or to conspire to 
engage in such conduct; providing criminal 
penalties; providing for enforcement; provid-
ing civil and equitable remedies; providing 
for the rights of innocent persons; and pro-
viding that any aggrieved person may insti-
tute civil proceedings to seek damages; and 
providing an effective date. 
This act enacts part 16, chapter 10, Title 
76, Utah Code Annotated 1953. - Laws 1981, 
ch. 94. 
76-10-1602. Definitions. As used in this part: 
(1) "Racketeering" means any act committed for financial gain which is illegal 
under the laws of Utah regardless of whether such act is in fact charged or 
indicted, involving: 
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(c) Aggravated kidnapping or kidnapping; 
(d) Forgery; 
(e) Aggravated burglary or burglary; 
(f) Asserting false claims including, but not limited to, false claims asserted 
through fraud, arson, unlawful public assistance, or Medicaid fraud; 
(g) Theft, including theft by deception, theft by extortion, theft of lost, mislaid 
or mistakenly delivered property, receiving stolen property, theft of services and 
theft by any person having custody of property pursuant to repair or rental agree-
ment; 
(h) Bribery; 
(i) Gambling; 
(j) Illegal kickbacks, including bribery to influence official or political actions 
and receiving a bribe or bribery for endorsement of a person as a public servant; 
(k) Extortionate extension, collection and financing of credit; 
(1) Trafficking in controlled substances, explosives, weapons or stolen property; 
(m) Aggravated arson or arson; 
(n) Promoting prostitution; 
(o) Obstructing or hindering criminal investigations or prosecutions; 
(p) False statements or publications concerning land for sale or lease or sale 
of subdivided lands or sale and mortgaging of unsubdivided lands; 
(q) Resale of realty with intent to defraud; 
(r) Sale of unregistered securities or real property securities or transactions 
involving such securities by unregistered dealers or salesmen; 
(s) A scheme or artifice to defraud; 
(t) Perjury; 
(u) Fraud in purchase or sale of securities; 
(v) The soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally aiding 
another in commission of any of the above enumerated offenses; 
(w) Conspiracy to commit any of the above enumerated offenses; or 
(x) An attempt to commit any of the above enumerated offenses. 
(2) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or ben-
eficial interest in property. 
(3) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corpo-
ration, business trust, association or other legal entity, and any union or group 
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as 
well as licit entities. 
(4) "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two episodes 
of racketeering conduct which have the same or similar objectives, results, partici-
pants, victims, or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distin-
guishing characteristics and are not isolated events, provided at least one of such 
episodes occurred after the effective date of this part and the last of which occurred 
within five years after the commission of a prior episode of racketeering conduct. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1602, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1603. Unlawful acts — Felony — Forfeitures. (1) It shall be unlawful 
for any person who has received any proceeds derived, whether directly or indi-
rectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity in which such person has partici-
pated, as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such 
proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in the acquis-
ition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activi-
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(3) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct 
of such enterprise's functions through a pattern of racketeering activity. 
(4) It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt or to conspire to violate any 
provision of subsections (1), (2), or (3) of this section, or to solicit, request, com-
mand, encourage, or intentionally aid another in the violation of any of the provi-
sions of subsections (1), (2), or (3) of this section. 
(5) Whoever violates any subsection of section 76-10-1603 shall be guilty of a 
second degree felony and in addition to the penalties prescribed by law shall forfeit 
to the state of Utah: 
(a) any interest acquired or maintained in violation of section 76-10-1603; and 
(b) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right 
of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise which he has estab-
lished, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in viola-
tion of section 76-10-1603 of this act. 
(6) In any action brought by the state of Utah or, any county in the state under 
this part, the district court shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders 
or prohibitions, and to take such other actions, including but not limited to, the 
acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or 
other interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as it shall deem proper. 
(7) Upon conviction of a person under this part, the court shall authorize the 
attorney general or the county attorney to seize all property or other interest 
declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and conditions as the court 
shall deem proper. If a property right or other interest is not exercisable or trans-
ferable for value by the convicted person it shall expire, and shall not revert to 
the convicted person. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1603, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1604. Enforcement authority of peace officers. Notwithstanding any 
law to the contrary, peace officers in the state of Utah shall have authority to 
enforce the criminal provisions of this act by initiating investigations, assisting 
grand juries, obtaining indictments, filing informations, and assisting in the prose-
cution of criminal cases through the attorney general or county attorneys' offices. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1604, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1605. Remedies of person injured by pattern of racketeering activity 
— Authorized orders of district court. (1) A person who sustains injury to his 
person, business, or property by a pattern of racketeering activity, in which he is 
not a participant, may file an action in the district court for the recovery of treble 
damages, the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any puni-
tive damages the court may deem reasonable. The state or any county may file an 
action on behalf of these persons injured or to prevent, restrain or remedy 
racketeering as defined by this part. 
(2) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy 
racketeering as defined by this part after making provision for the rights of all 
innocent persons affected by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropri-
ate, by issuing appropriate orders. The court shall determine issues by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, and proceedings under this section shall be independent of 
any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under the laws of this state. 
^ (3) Prior to a determination of liability such orders may include, but are not 
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or such other actions, includ-
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(4) Following a determination of liability such orders may include, but are not 
limited to: 
(a) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in 
any enterprise. 
(b) Imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of 
any person, including prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of 
endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect the laws of 
Utah, to the extent the constitutions of the United States and Utah permit. 
(c) Ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise. 
(d) Ordering the payment of treble damages to those persons who are not found 
to be participants and are injured by the racketeering. 
(e) Ordering the payment of all costs and expenses of the prosecution and inves-
tigation of any offenses included in the definition of racketeering, incurred by the 
state, to be paid to the general fund of the state. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1605, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1606. Payments to general fund of state. The court may order payment 
to the general fund of the state as appropriate, to the extent not already ordered 
to be paid in other damages, of: 
(1) Any interest acquired or maintained by a person in violation of section 
76-10-1603. 
(2) Any interest in, security of, claims against or property or contractual rights 
of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise which a person has 
established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in 
violation of section 76-10-1603. 
(3) An amount equal to the gain a person has acquired or maintained through 
an oifense included in the definition of racketeering. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1606, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1607. Evidentiary value of criminal judgment in civil proceeding. A 
final judgement or decree rendered in favor of the state or a county in any criminal 
proceeding brought by this state or a county shall preclude the defendant from 
denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil 
proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1607, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1608. Separability clause. If any part of application of the Utah 
Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprises Act is held invalid, the remain-
der of this part, or its application to other situations or persons, shall not be 
affected. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1608, enacted by Effective Date. 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. Section 2 of Laws 1981, ch. 94 provided: 
"This act shall take effect July 1,1981." 
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PART 17 
CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING DECENCY ACT 
Section 
76-10-1701 to 76-10-1708. Repealed. 
76-10-1701 to 76-10-1708. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 5, § 1 repeals ble Television Programming Decency Act, ef-
§§ 76-10-1701 to 76-10-1708, as enacted by fective April 25, 1988. 
Laws 1983, ch. 207, §§ 1 to 8, entitled the Ca-
PART 18 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Section 
76-10-1801. Communications fraud. 
76-10-1801. Communications fraud. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omis-
sions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is 
guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is $100 or less; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $100 but does not 
exceed $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not 
exceed $10,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not 
exceed $100,000; 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and 
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) 
shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained 
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
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(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act 
and offense of communication fraud. 
(6) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, 
make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to 
transmit information. Means of communication include, but are not limited 
to, use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, com-
puter, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted 
by the defendant were not made or omitted knowingly or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1801, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 157, § 2. 
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Michael S. Eldredge (USB#0967) 
Terry C. Turner (USB#3299) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
5295 South 320 West, Suite 540 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone 263-1511 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W. 
BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES, 
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE 
HOLCOMB, 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES 
TO PLAINTIFFS1 REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. C-86-1302 
Judge Timothy Hansen 
* * * * * * * 
COME NOW Defendants Holcomb and Vantage Income Properties, and 
pursuant to the Order of the Court entered herein on October 5, 
1987, supplement their responses to Plaintiffs1 Request for Production 
of Documents as previously delivered to Plaintiffs on April 8, 1987. 
Request No. l. A copy of the document dissolving Vantage Income 
Properties. 
Response: Said document was produced on April 8, 1987. 
Request No, 2. A copy of the Vantage Income Properties' Training 
Manual for appraisers and salesmen. 
Response: Said document was erroneously indicated as having 
been produced on April 8, 1987, however, Defendants have been 
unable to locate such documents. Defendants have no objection to 
producing such documents and will continue their efforts to locate 
such documents and produce them if and when they are available. 
Request No. 3, Names of all of Steve Holcomb's customers while he 
was at Vantage Income Properties. 
Response: Such information does not exist on a single document, 
however can be derived from the sales records of Vantage Income 
Properties. Defendants object to producing such information and/or 
documents, and invoke their 5th amendment privilege against self-
incrimination for the following reasons. Plaintiffs have stated 
repeatedly, in their oral arguments before this Court on April 8, 
1987, in their Memorandum in Support of Striking Defendants1 Answer 
on file herein, and in their oral argument before this Court on 
October 5, 1987, that the expressed purpose of obtaining information 
under this request is to discover information that will support 
their claims under the First Cause of Action in the Complaint 
herein against Defendants for alleged violations of the Utah Racket-
eering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act ("RICE") specifically 
enumerated in §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q) and (s). 
The specific provisions allegedly violated by Defendants, as 
set forth in the First Cause of Action in the Complaint herein, 
constitute a second degree felony in the State of Utah. §§ 76-
10-1602 and 76-10-1603 state that a "pattern of racketeering 
activity" must be proved to establish liability. Plaintiffs 
further assert in their First, Second and Fourth Causes of Action 
that Defendants have committed acts or omissions that would 
constitute criminal violations of the Communications Fraud statute 
found at § 76-10-1801 of the Criminal Code which would also 
constitute a second degree felony. 
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Plaintiffs seek to support their allegations of racketeering 
in the Complaint herein by "fishing" through the sales records and 
customers of Steve Holcomb in an attempt to find anyone who might 
join in Plaintiffs1 criminal allegations and thus establish a 
"pattern of racketeering activity." This was expressly represented 
by Paul Newton, counsel for Plaintiffs at the hearing on October 
5, 1987, who stated substantially, or words to the effect, that 
Plaintiffs wanted to find other customers who were no longer 
"loyal" to Mr. Holcomb, and assist Plaintiffs in their efforts to 
"get him off the streets." 
If Defendants are required to produce such documents, and, if 
Plaintiffs are successful in establishing sufficient evidence from 
such records that Defendants have indeed violated provisions of 
RICE and thus committed a second degree felony, then such violations 
shall have been established through their own testimony, in direct 
conflict with their expressed desire and constitutional privilege 
not to provide any testimony that would tend to incriminate 
themselves. It is well established that Plaintiffs have a 
burden of establishing such criminal liability on the face of 
their complaint in order to obtain the treble damages they seek 
as civil relief under §76-10-1605. If Plaintiffs have carried 
their burden, there is no need for further supportive discovery. 
If they have not pleaded violations of RICE sufficient to establish 
liability under RICE, which in this case is clear they have not, 
then they cannot force Defendants, in violation of their 5th 
amendment rights, to provide information that could be used in 
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any way to establish such liability and prove that Defendants had 
indeed committed a second degree felony. 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Holcomb has previously waived 
his 5th amendment rights in testimony found on pages 48, 54, 59, 
60, and 84-88 of Mr. Holcombfs deposition of December 4, 1986, 
which deposition remains unpublished in this action. Defendants 
assert that Defendant Holcomb has made no representation whatsoever 
on those pages, or at any other part of said deposition that he has 
committed any act that can be construed as a criminal violation of 
RICE or any other criminal statute that would constitute a waiver 
of his 5th amendment rights, nor has he testified to any matter 
therein that can only be verified or established by a review of the 
sales records of Vantage Income Properties or customer lists of 
Steve Holcomb. 
Mr. Newton argued before the Court on October 5, 1987 that Mr. 
Holcomb had testified that there were numerous times that he had 
to take property back, implying to the Court that Mr. Holcomb had 
committed alleged criminal acts. As clearly stated on the pages 
referred to by Plaintiffs1 counsel in the deposition, each decision 
by Mr. Holcomb to take property back was based on a business judgment 
that served the interests of all parties concerned, and in no 
instance were the Defendants ever compelled to take back such 
properties. 
In summary, Defendants object to providing information in the 
sales records or from Mr. Holcomb1s list of customers on the basis 
that any information found by Plaintiffs in such records and lists 
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that could support their expressed goal of proving their allegations 
of criminal violations by Defendants, and establish a pattern of 
racketeering, or any other provision of the RICE or Communications 
Fraud statutes, would accordingly be incriminating, and consequently 
Defendants invoke their 5th amendment right not to testify in any 
manner against themselves. This objection is supported by Defendants1 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs1 Motion to Strike Defendants' 
Answer which was previously filed in this matter and argued before 
the Court on October 5, 1987, which memorandum is incorporated 
herein by reference. 
Request No. 4. The record for all sales at Vantage Income Properties. 
Response: Defendants incorporate their response to Request 
No. 3 as if fully set forth herein. 
Request No. 5. A market analysis form of Vantage Income Properties. 
Response: Said document was produced on April 8, 1987. 
Request No. 6. A work-up sheet of Vantage Income Properties. 
Response: Said document was produced on April 8, 1987. 
Request No. 7. A sales training information sheet of Vantage 
Income Properties. 
Response: Said document was produced on April 8, 1987. 
Request No. 8. A neighborhood survey prepared by Vantage Income 
Properties. 
Response: Said document was produced on April 8, 1987. 
Request No. 9. A copy of the listing agreement between Vantage 
Income Properties and Morris and Jo D'leen Nesmith. 
Response: Upon review of the records and documents of the 
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transactions between Nesmiths and Plaintiffs, Defendants have 
been unable to locate a listing agreement between Nesmiths and 
Vantage Income Properties, Defendants believe that no such 
agreement was ever entered into, and that Nesmiths negotiated 
with Plaintiffs solely on the basis of the earnest money offer 
presented by Plaintiffs, after Vantage Income Properties had 
determined from Nesmiths that they were interested selling their 
property if a suitable offer were made. This practice is not 
uncommon in the industry. 
Request No. 10. A copy of the 1986 tax return for Steve Holcomb. 
Response: Said document is expected to be available on or 
about October 15, 1987 when Mr. Holcomb's extension for filing 
will expire. It will be forwarded to Plaintiffs immediately as 
it becomes available. ^r\ 
DATED this _day of \^C££(}&L , 987. 
MICHAEL S. ELDREI 
Co-counsel for Defendants 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs1 Request 
For Production of Documents to James L. Christensen, Esq. and 
Paul D. Newton, Esq., counsel for Plaintiffs, at CORBRIDGE, BAIRD 
& CHRISTENSEN, 215 South State Street^ Suite 800, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this _day of 
? et. 
, 1987 
l4/(lruaJc' 
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EXl-SlI.V ' C ~ ; 
Michael S. Eldredge (USB#0976) 
SNOW & HALLIDAY 
Attorney for Appellants 
261 East 300 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-4940 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARION H. WEBB and JILL W. 
BROWN, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES, 
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE 
HOLCOMB, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Affidavit of Counsel 
Case No 880137 
Priority Classification 
No, 14(b) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MICHAEL S. ELDREDGE, first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That he is counsel for Appellants in the above-captioned 
matter; 
2. That the matters testified to herein are based upon his 
own personal knowledge; 
3. That it was necessary to expend approximately 45 hours 
to research issues, prepare motions, draft arguments and prepare 
the Appelantsf Brief in this appeal as of the time of filing 
of said brief; 
4. The affiant charges as legal fees for an appeal such as 
this at $100 per hour, which rates are commensurate with rates 
normally found for such legal services in Salt Lake City, Utah; 
5. That Appellants have incurred approximately $4,500 in fees 
in bringing this appeal; 
6. That in the legal opinion of the Affiant, Appellants1 
incurring of such fees was necessary to preserve their constitutional 
rights to privilege against self-incrimination; 
7. That Appellants are entitled to, and are in need of an 
order from this Court awarding costs and attorney's fees incurred 
as of the date of the decision in this appeal. 
9. Further, the affiar^t ^ sayetl^naught. 
DATED this £> day of \ A A0W*~ , 1989 
MICHAEL S. 
Attorney for Appellant? 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
"Ula^aJ^ , 1989. 
day of 
(UJI+C Q-Sty 
NOTARY PUBLIC^ • " „ . yL
 y 
Res id ing a t : UcuSt4~ (XTLA^JL^, lAJ&*~ 
My Commission Exp ires : L/ir7/(£c, 
Seal-
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